The victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War was of world-historical significance, having "a profound impact on the entire course of world development" 1 . One of the most important results of the defeat of German fascism was the victory of the people's democratic and socialist revolutions in a number of states of Central and South-Eastern Europe. These countries include Romania. The greeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the liberation of Romania from the fascist yoke noted: "As a result of the victorious offensive of the Soviet Army, the crushing defeat of a large group of Hitlerite troops during the Iasi-Kishinev operation and the armed uprising of patriotic forces Romania, led by the communists, was swept away by the hated regime of the military-fascist dictatorship, and the path to building a new society opened up for the Romanian people. " 2
Much has been written about the uprising of August 23, 1944. The concept of reactionary bourgeois historiography about the anti-fascist uprising in Bucharest and other cities of Romania, the role of the Red Army in the liberation of this country was formed mainly during the Cold War. Its creators generally denied the very fact of an armed uprising of the masses in Romania under the leadership of the Communist Party of Romania (CPR) and represented the overthrow of the dictatorship of Russia. Antonescu as a" coup d'etat", "top conspiracy", "palace putsch" carried out by King Mihai and his entourage. At the same time, some authors, mainly English and American , praised the king and his entourage, 3 and also emphasized the "merits" in the fight against the military-fascist dictatorship of the leaders of the so - called historical parties-the National Tsaranist (NCP) Y. Maniu and the National Liberal (NLP) D. Bratianu .4 Others, especially West German historians and former Hitlerite generals, wanting to justify the defeat of Germany and belittle the generalship of the Soviet command during the Iasi-Kishinev operation, on the contrary, branded the king and the Romanian army, who, as a result of the "betrayal" of the allied duty, allegedly "opened the gates to the Balkans to the Soviet troops"5 . In other words, the act of August 23 and Romania's withdrawal from the war were not caused by the defeat of the German-Fascist and Romanian troops during the Iasi-Kishinev operation, but on the contrary. There is also this statement: thanks to the events of August 23 and the transition of the Romanian army to the side of the anti-Hitler coalition, it was possible to clear the entire Romanian territory of the Germans in the shortest possible time, and the Soviet Army was able to march with weapons on its shoulder through the country, heading for Hungary and Bulgaria.

1 Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On the 40th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945". - Pravda, 17. VI. 1984.

2 Pravda, 23. VIII. 1984.

3 Gol d Lee A. Crown against the Sickle. The Story of King Michael of Rumania. Lnd. 1950, p. 31; Seton-Watson H. The East European Revolution. Lnd. 1950, pp. 89- 90; Wolff R. The Balkans in Our Time. Cambridge. 1956, p. 241.

4 Markham R. H. Rumania under the Soviet Yoke. Boston. 1949, p. 179; Bishop R., Crayfield E. S. Russia Astride the Balkans. Lnd. 1949, pp. 36 - 37.

5 Frisner G. Lost Battles, Moscow, 1966, pp. 86, 88, 89; Wegncr W. Die Teilung Europas. Stuttgart. 1960, S. 99.

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Falsification of the events of those days is still taking place at the present time, and these points of view are now being raised to the shield by imperialist propaganda. 6 With rare exceptions, 7 it evades the truth, distorts in every possible way the significance of the defeat of the German and Romanian armies at Iasi and Kishinev, denies the decisive role of the Red Army in the liberation of Romania and other countries, tries to present the liberation mission of the USSR in the form of exporting the revolution, and calls the soldiers of the Red Army "occupiers". In addition, it denies or even ignores the role of the Communist Party and the masses in overthrowing the Antonescu dictatorship.

Marxist historians have shown that the uprising of August 23, 1944 in Romania was prepared by "the entire course of the country's economic development." 8 Its prerequisites gradually matured during the years of Romania's participation in the war against the USSR and finally formed in the summer of 1944. Soviet historians made a significant contribution to the study of the history of the uprising of August 23, 1944 and the liberation of Romania from fascism .9 A large number of works on this subject have been published in socialist Romania .10 However, not all aspects of this problem are equally studied in these works. In particular, the correlation of internal and external factors that determined the collapse of the fascist regime in Romania is covered in various ways.

In the war against the USSR, the Romanian ruling circles, like the ruling circles of Germany, harbored aggressive goals .11 These goals were in line with the interests of the Ministry of Defense-

6 Lucacs J. 1945: Year Zero. Garden City (N. Y.). 1978, pp. 291 - 294; ejusd. War on the Eastern Front, 1941 - 1945. Lnd. 1979, p. 114; Jacob sen H. T. Der Weg zur Teilung der Welt: Politik und Strategie 1939 - 1945. Koblenz, 1978, S. 19; Hobbs R. The Myth of Victory. What is Victory in War. Boulder (Col.). 1979, p. 271; Der Zweite Weltkrieg. Bd. 3. Stuttgart. 1979, S. 104; Mastny V. Moskaus Weg zum kalten Krieg: von der Kriegsallianz zur sowjetischen Wehrmachtstellung in Osteuropa. Munchen. 1980, S. 130, 369 - 372; Jelavich B. History of the Balkans. Vol. 2. Cambridge (Mass.). 1983, pp. 254 - 255.

7 Some bourgeois authors correctly conclude that it was not the political events of August 23 in Bucharest, but the defeat of the fascist armies during the Iasi-Kishinev operation that led to the defeat of the Wehrmacht, and therefore, in a "militarily hopeless situation, the Antonescu regime fell" (Gruchmann L. Der Zweite Weltkrieg. Stuttgart. 1973, S. 207; Hurten H. Zwischenkriegszeit und Zweiter Weltkrieg. Stuttgart, 1982, p. 88), that in a favorable situation for the uprising, created as a result of the defeat of the fascist troops, the communist-led uprising of August 23 took place (Bartsch M., Schebesch H. F., Scheppelmann R. Der Krieg im Osten 1941 - 1945: historische Einfiihrung, Kommentare und Dokumente. Koln. 1981, S. 205 - 206).

8 See N. I. Lebedev's preface in Romania during the People's Democratic Revolution 1944-1947, Moscow, 1974, p. 10.

9 Among the works of the last 15 years, see: Liberation of South-Eastern and Central Europe by the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts, 1944-1945. Moscow, 1970; History of Romania. 1918-1970. Vol. 2. M. 1971; Liberation mission of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Second World War. M. 1971; Antosiak A.V. In the battles for the freedom of Romania. M. 1974; The birth of the People's armies of the Warsaw Pact countries. 1941-1949 M. 1975; Paklin N. A. The collapse of the Antonescu dictatorship. - New and modern History, 1976, NN 3, 4; From the history of People's democratic and socialist revolutions in the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe. Moscow 1977; Great October and the revolutions of the 40s in the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe. Moscow 1977; Soviet Union and the struggle of the peoples of Central and South-Eastern Europe. South-Eastern Europe for freedom and independence. 1944-1945 M. 1978; History of the Second World War 1939-1945. Vol. 9. M. 1978, pp. 97-110; Levit I. E. Collapse of the policy of aggression of the Antonescu dictatorship (19. XI. 1942-23. VIII. 1944). Chisinau. 1983; Lebedev N. I. The Collapse of fascism in Romania, Moscow, 1983; Muntyan M. A. The Battle of Iasi-Kishinev and the Liberation of Romania. - New and recent History, 1983, N 4; The Second World War. Brief History, Moscow, 1984; Semiryaga, Moscow. I. The liberation mission of the Soviet Army during the Great Patriotic War, Moscow, 1984. International feat. Moscow, 1984; Hadji Murad Ibragimbeyli. Liberation mission of the USSR in the countries of Central and South - Eastern Europe. - Voprosy istorii, 1985, N 5; et al.

10 For a list of works by contemporary Romanian historians, see Bibliografia istorica a Romaniei. Vol. I. Bucureti. 1970; vol. 5. 1980. Historiographical review of Romanian literature on the topic: Rusenescu N. Istoriografia romaneasca privind insurecjia antifascists din august 1944 si urmarile sale. - Studii. Revista de istorie, 1969, N 4; Simion A. Contributii la istoriografia romaneasca privind perioada 1940 - 1944 din istoria patriei - Anale de istorie, 1974, N 1.

11 For more information, see Voprosy istorii, 1985, No. 7, pp. 68-82.

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narkhia, bourgeoisie and landlords, the aspirations of outspoken supporters of fascism. The King and his entourage, the leaders of the NCP and NLP approved the entry of fascist Romania into the war against the USSR. They were very impressed by the anti-communist appeals of the country's ruler (conductor), General Y. Antonescu and his cliques 12 . Under the influence of fascist propaganda, which convinced them of the" invincibility " of the Wehrmacht and promised a quick victory, some layers of the urban petty bourgeoisie, hoping to profit from the war, and some soldiers and peasants who succumbed to promises to give them land on Soviet territory, were drawn into the orbit of nationalist sentiment.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party, which operated deep underground, explained in appeals to the people and in directives to the party's grassroots organizations that the war unleashed by Germany against the USSR was predatory and criminal, and that the Soviet people were fighting not only for their own freedom, but also for the freedom of all the peoples of the world, including "the Romanian people, enslaved a bloody fascist gang " 13 . The Communist Party sought to consolidate all anti-fascist forces in a united front on the basis of the "Platform of the United national front of the Romanian people against the fascist occupiers and the military fascist clique led by the traitor Antonescu"formulated in the resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 6 September 1941. This platform provided for ending the war against the USSR, joining its side in the fight against Hitlerism, expelling the fascist troops from the country, overthrowing the Antonescu dictatorship and creating a government of national independence; abolishing the Vienna Arbitration regarding Northern Transylvania; punishing the perpetrators of the war .14 However, not only the leaders of the NCP and the NLP, but also the leaders of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) have consistently rejected the Communist Party's proposals to create a united front.

During the days of temporary successes of Hitler's troops on the Eastern Front in the summer and autumn of 1941, the ruling circles of fascist Romania managed to partially fulfill their aggressive goals. Romanian troops occupied the Moldavian SSR and a number of regions of the Ukrainian SSR. This was achieved at the cost of huge military losses (according to the data of the Romanian military command, presented to the leadership of the Wehrmacht, they amounted to 70 thousand killed and about 100 thousand wounded from the end of June to October 6, 1941) .15 Already in the battles for Odessa, fear and confusion reigned in the Romanian troops, desertion grew. In the army, anti-war sentiments began to manifest themselves among the soldiers. An important role in this was played by the explanatory work among the front-line units of the Romanian Army, which was conducted by the political organizations of the Red Army: during the first month of the war, only the Political Propaganda Department of the 9th Army of the Southern Front distributed more than 13.5 million copies to Romanian units. leaflets and 60 thousand copies.. the newspaper " Vocea poporului "("Voice of the People"), published by the Political Department of this front; on the front line, special broadcasts were organized for Romanian soldiers through sound amplification units .16 These leaflets and broadcasts revealed the class nature of the war, the disastrous consequences for Rumania of an alliance with Hitlerite Germany, and stressed that the Soviet people drew a clear line between the Rumanian people and the exploiting classes of Rumania; that they, driven by a sense of internationalism, wanted friendship with the Rumanian working people .17 Anti-war sentiments in the Romanian army increased after the defeat of the Nazis near Moscow, which dispelled the myth of the invincibility of the Wehrmacht and buried plans for a" lightning " war.

12 Timpul, 24. VI. 1941; Studii, 1956, N 6, p. 20; Popescu-Putsuri I. et al. Romania in World War II. Bucharest, 1964, p. 21; Lebedev N. I. The Collapse of fascism in Romania, Moscow, 1976, p. 341, 400.

13 Documente din istoria Partidului Comunist din Romania (DIPCR). Bucuresti. 1951, p. 323.

14 Ibid., pp. 324 - 325.

15 Hillgruber A. Hitler, Konig Carol und Marschall Antonescu. Die deutsch- rumanischen Beziehungen 1938 - 1944. Wiesbaden. 1965, S. 138.

16 Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR (TsAMO USSR), f. 228, op. 710, d. 170, ll. 11-12, 18; f. 904, op. 641617, d. 5, l. 376.

17 Central State Archive of the Moldavian SSR (TSGA MSSR), f. 694, op. 3, 123, l. 93.

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News of the plight of their families in the rear also contributed to the strengthening of such sentiments among the soldiers. Indeed, the financial situation of the Romanian workers, which was already difficult, worsened even more in the first months of the war. In a country that supplied Germany with millions of tons of oil, timber, and food, the people suffered from hunger and cold. According to the reports of the secret police (Sigurants), in January - February 1942, due to the deterioration of the economic situation, unrest broke out in many industrial enterprises, and in connection with requisitions in the village, "ferment among the rural population"increased .18 The peasants ' discontent was also caused by the fact that the Antonescu clique's promise to allocate land plots to participants in the anti-Soviet war in the occupied Soviet territory turned out to be a hoax. Only capitalists, speculators, the highest ranks of the state apparatus and the command staff of the army benefited from its plunder and the policy of so-called Romanization of the occupied regions. The police reported that the government and Antonescu himself were being criticized; that the famine-stricken population "looks with anger at the rich, who get everything at speculative prices and do not need anything"; that one of the main reasons for discontent is "the presence of German troops" 19. Despite the discontent of the masses and disagreements in the ruling elite regarding the extent of Romania's participation in the battles on the Soviet-German front, Antonescu decided to allocate large forces for the military operations of 1942. Together with the German Romanian troops moved to Stalingrad and the North Caucasus.

For Romania, participation in the Battle of Stalingrad ended in disaster, which caused a sharp increase in anti-war sentiment in the army and among the Romanian population, deepening the crisis of the Antonescu dictatorship. All 18 divisions of the 3rd and 4th Romanian armies, thrown into battle on the Don and Volga, were defeated; 72 thousand Romanian soldiers and officers were captured 20 ; about the rest in the reports of these armies it was said: "The moral and physical condition of most of the officers and soldiers is broken", "at the moment on the territory of the these troops cannot be counted on for military operations... soldiers only think about returning to their homeland"21 . The news of the Stalingrad disaster caused panic. In a letter dated February 2, 1943, Hitler demanded that Antonescu "take the necessary measures as quickly as possible to maintain the combat capability and morale of the Romanian formations."22
The government and military command of Romania have taken up the "moral recovery" of the army and the civilian population. However, neither the repressions nor the assurances of fascist propaganda that in the summer of 1943 a new offensive would lead the countries of the Hitlerite bloc to victory had any effect. Secret orders issued by the Romanian general Staff noted that they had failed to "convince the public of the need to continue the war against the Soviets"; despite the prohibitions and harsh punishments, the army and people still "discuss issues related to the military and political situation, inculcate defeatism, and criticize the authorities" 23 . Romania's ruling circles were most afraid of the influence of communist ideas. The "Instructions on the moral Education of soldiers" sent out by the Romanian General Staff stated that the most important task of the officers was to "prevent the penetration of Bolshevism into the country." 24
Meanwhile, more and more news, deplorable for the fascists, came from the front.

18 Chernivtsi Regional State Archive (CHOGA), f. 30, op. 4, d. 2, l. 408; d. 198, l. 338; d. 197, l. 501; d. 234, ll. 475, 476, 478; f. R-307, op. 2, d. 134, l. 2.

19 TsGA MSSR, f. 680, op. 1, - d. 4178, l. 166; CHOGA, f. 30, op. 4, d. 197, l. 478; d. 234, l. 34.

20 Central and Southeastern European countries in World War II. Military-historical reference Book, Moscow, 1972, p. 195.

21 Anale, 1960, n 1, p. 91; TsGA MSSR, f. 706, op. 2, d. 9, l. 210.

22 Historical and Diplomatic Archive, f. Microfilms of Romanian documents (IDA, f. MRD), Dosar: Copii schimb de scrisori intre Fuhrer si d-1 M-l Antonescu, f. 304, Military Cabinet, on. 2, 22, l. 34.

23 Central State Administration of the MSSR, f. MRD, Marelle Stat Major, ordinary circular N 228564 din 19. XII. 1942; N 462975 din 19. VI. 1943; f. 706, on. 2, d. 9, l. 197.

24 Ibid., f. MRD, Instructiuni pentra educafia mqrala a ostasil.

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Operation Citadel near Kursk ended in complete failure. The "planned evacuation" from the Taman Peninsula ended with the loss of about 60 thousand German and Romanian servicemen. The Red Army's offensive in Ukraine continued. At the beginning of November 1943, the 4th and 24th Romanian infantry divisions, which were part of the 6th German Army on the Lower Dnieper, were defeated, many soldiers and officers surrendered, more than 5 thousand fled .25 The mood of despair reigned among the Romanian divisions trapped in the Crimea. In February 20, 1944, the secret services reported from there to Bucharest: "The morale of the Romanian troops continues to fall. In general, it is considered that the Romanian troops... written off", "officers and soldiers are extremely dissatisfied and no longer believe the words of the marshal" (Antonescu - I. L.)26 . Some anti-fascist Romanian soldiers defected to the Soviet partisans, fought in their ranks, and later received Soviet government awards .27
Of particular importance for the development of the anti-fascist struggle of the Romanian people was the second conference of representatives of Romanian prisoners of war , 28 held with the permission of the Soviet Government in Krasnogorsk, near Moscow, in early September 1943. It was attended by 2 thousand people. There, a program was adopted that provided for Romania's withdrawal from the war, the establishment of a democratic regime in the country, and friendship with the USSR. At the request of the prisoners of war, on October 4, 1943, the State Defense Committee of the USSR adopted a resolution on the formation of the 1st Romanian Infantry Volunteer Division, which was later named after a prominent figure in the Romanian national liberation movement, T. Vladimirescu. In three days, 12 thousand applications were submitted to join it. Anti-fascist emigrants, including many communists, were among the first to enter. The Soviet command allocated weapons, uniforms and food for the newly formed division according to the norms in force in the Red Army. 29 However, in those months there were still many soldiers in the Romanian army who, under the influence of Fascist propaganda, were afraid to surrender or continued to be influenced by monarchist and nationalist illusions .30
The crisis of the Antonescu dictatorship was also exacerbated by the further deterioration of the country's economic situation. The Siguranza report of July 1943 noted that discontent was spreading not only among the working people, but also among the middle and petty bourgeoisie; that only the owners of "industrial enterprises working for the army are developing rapid activity." 31 Despite the harsh wartime laws, a wave of strikes soon swept through the country's industrial centers .32 Only from October 15 to November 15, 1943, workers ' demonstrations took place in 23 cities (Bucharest, Arad, Oltenica, etc.) .33 Acts of sabotage and sabotage at enterprises related to military production (Malaxa, Vulkan, etc.), oil fields, shipyards in Constanta, in Danube ports, and on the communication lines of German troops became more frequent. 34 The peasants, in order to avoid requisitions, hid bread and cattle, and increasingly refused to perform labor duties. The secret services reported that "the working masses are slowly but surely moving into the dangerous zone of communist influence," and in some places "they are being influenced by Russian prisoners sent to work for state and private enterprises."-

25 Ibid., SSI. Nota informative N 357.

26 Ibid., Nota 22 si 26. II. 1944.

27 Ukrainian SSR in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945 Vol. 3. Kiev. 1975, p. 124; Shevchenko F. P. On the participation of Romanians in the partisan movement in Ukraine during the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. In: On Romanian-Russian and Romanian-Soviet Relations, Moscow, 1960.

28 The first conference was held in January 1942.

29 Antosyak A.V. Uk. soch., pp. 51-54

30 TsAMO SSSR, f. 371, on. 6386, d. 112, l. 217.

31 IDA, f. MRD, Darea do searna asupra starii de spirit... in intervalul I.-31. VII. 1943; f. 305, General Staff, on. 2, d. 28, l. 212.

32 Anale, 1956, N 3, p. 71; 1960. N 1, p. 88; 1963, N 4, pp. 80 - 84; 1964, N 2, p. 29; 1964, N 3, pp. 43, 87; 1965, N 2, p. 29.

33 Lebedev N. I. The Fall of the Antonescu Dictatorship, Moscow, 1966, p. 443; Studii. 1959, N 4, p. 128.

34 Anale, 1960, N 1, p. 86; 1064, N 3, p. 90; N 5, pp. 26 - 31; 1969, N 4, pp. 97, 120.

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They see the possible arrival of the Russians as the beginning of workers 'rule", "rejoice at any event that weakens the military strength of the Reich", openly express their sympathies for the Red Army and the Communist Party, and "are determined to put an end to the existing regime"; that "the peasant masses are making ever greater social and economic demands"35 .

The victories of the Red Army contributed to the rise of the anti-fascist liberation movement that began in the first days of the war in the Soviet territory occupied by Romania. Having lost confidence in the successful outcome of the war, the Romanian rulers were in a hurry to siphon off as much good as possible from the temporarily occupied Soviet lands. However, their policy of looting and violence was constantly met with resistance. At the beginning of 1944, in the territory between the Bug and the Prut, the struggle against the invaders took on a nationwide character .36 Panicked Romanian officials, businessmen and industrialists, and wounded soldiers returning home from the front contributed to the strengthening of defeatist sentiments in the country. As for the Antonescu clique, after the collapse of the Kursk Bulge, it increasingly pinned its hopes for salvation on W. Churchill's plans for the landing of Anglo-American troops in the Balkans. Relying on the help of certain circles of Britain and the United States, with which emissaries of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania M. Antonescu established contact through neutral countries in late 1942-early 1943.37, the Romanian oligarchy hoped to preserve the bourgeois-landlord system, as well as, if not all the occupied Soviet territories, then at least Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. M. Antonescu said at a government meeting on February 4, 1943, that Romanian propaganda should convince Western politicians that the role of "dam against Slavism" and " defender of European civilization"Romania can only implement it through Bessarabia and Bukovina" 38 .

The leaders of the NCP and NLP, according to the secret Police report, also held "the view of the unconditional continuation of the war against the USSR", even if the problem of Northern Transylvania had to be temporarily postponed .39 In August 1943, Maniu sent a message to the governments of the United States and Britain via Stockholm, assuring the Western powers that the NCP and NLP had already prepared everything to replace the existing regime "peacefully" (without involving the masses in active struggle) as soon as Anglo-American troops appeared on the Danube. At the same time, he said that the NCP shares Antonescu's point of view regarding "the need to protect Bessarabia." And this meant the continuation of the war against the USSR 40 .

Only the Communist Party consistently fought in the country against the fascist regime and for an exit from the anti-Soviet war. The authority of the Communist Party among the working people grew. Its voice was now being listened to by people who did not share communist views, but who wanted peace, the country's liberation from the fascist dictatorship and dependence on Germany. As early as the end of 1942, thanks to the efforts of the Communist Party, the "Union of Patriots" emerged, bringing together representatives of various strata of the population, including the progressive intelligentsia and the petty bourgeoisie. On January 28, 1943, No. 1 of the union's organ, the newspaper "Romania Libera" ("Free Romania"), was published. In the second half of 1943, the Patriotic Anti-Hitler Front (PAF) emerged, which, together with the Communist Party, included the Front of Farmers and the Union of Patriots,

35 CHOGA, f. 30, op. 4, d. 395, ll. 360, 368; Studii, 1959, n 4, p. 128; Anale, 1960, N 1, p. 89; Lebedev N. I. The Collapse of fascism in Romania. 1976, p. 443.

36 For more details, see: Levit I. E. Participation of fascist Romania in aggression against the USSR, pp. 235-372; his. The collapse of the aggression policy of the Antonescu Dictatorship, pp. 164-244.

37 Israelyan V. L., Kutakov L. N. Diplomacy of Aggressors, Moscow, 1967, pp. 269-271; Lebedev N. I. Krakh fascizma v Rumanii [The Collapse of fascism in Romania]. 1976, pp. 418-419, 424-425-Anale, 1960, N 1, pp. 95-100.

38 TsGA MSSR, f. 706, op. 1, d. 586, ll. 216-219.

39 CHOGA, f. 30, op. 4, d. 477, l. 486.

40 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS). Diplomatic Papers 1943. Vol. I. Waschington. 1963, pp. 498, 499.

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The Union of Hungarian Workers of Romania and some grassroots organizations of the Social Democratic Party, although the SDP leadership, which maintained contacts with the leaders of the "historical" parties, refused to join the PAF 41 .

Rejecting the EPR's offers of cooperation, the leadership of the NCP and the NLP did everything possible to isolate the Communists and prevent them from deciding the fate of the country. "With the Eastern Front line approaching," the Secret Police reported, " the National Tsaranists are confident that if the German resistance is broken, Britain and America will intervene at the right moment, and Romania will fall into the sphere of Anglo-American influence."42 But, although London and Washington hatched plans to prevent the advance of Soviet troops to the West, on October 19-30, 1943, at the Moscow Conference of foreign Ministers of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain, it was agreed that in response to peace proposals coming from German satellites, they should be presented with a demand for unconditional surrender to the anti-Hitler coalition 43 . Then, in late November and early December, at the Tehran Conference of the heads of government of the three powers, it was decided to open a second front in Europe through France. This meant rejecting Churchill's" Balkan version", although the latter still clung to it for a long time .44
Antonescu's government, which coordinated foreign policy actions with the leaders of "historical" parties, flatly refused to capitulate to the Red Army and allow it to enter Romania to expel German troops. January 31, 1944 it informed representatives of the United States and England: "When the British and American armies approach the Danube, the Romanian army will stand at the Dniester and repel the attacks of the Red Army." 45 During negotiations with Hitler on February 26 - 27 and March 23-24, 1944, J. Antonescu asked the Fuhrer to quickly arm the new Romanian divisions formed as a result of the next mobilization. Hitler, interested in holding Romania, promised the conductor "drastic changes" on the Eastern Front .46 But the promised changes didn't happen.

In March-the first half of April 1944, the Red Army liberated the Odessa and Chernivtsi regions, the northern and eastern regions of the Moldavian SSR from German and Romanian invaders. The great-power calculations of the Antonescu clique were failing. On March 26, Soviet troops crossed the border with Romania, marking the beginning of its liberation from the fascist regime, and by mid-April they had cleared an area of almost 10 thousand square kilometers and over 800 settlements with about 400 thousand people from German and Romanian troops .47 On 2 April, the Government of the USSR issued a statement stating that "it does not pursue the goal of acquiring any part of Romanian territory or changing the existing system of Romania" and that "the entry of Soviet troops into Romania is dictated solely by military necessity and the continued resistance of enemy troops" .48 This statement received a wide response, showing the falsity of the fabrications of enemy propaganda about the" hostile intentions " of the USSR regarding Romania .49
The activities of the Soviet military administration in the liberated areas of Romania were conducted in full compliance with the Soviet Government's Declaration of Independence.

41 Anale, 1969, N 3, pp. 21 - 22; 1978, N 4, p. 128.

42 CHOGA, f. 30, on. 4, d. 394, l. 872.

43 The Soviet Union at international conferences of the period of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, Vol. I. M. 1978, pp. 186-187, 363-364.

44 Undasynov I. N. Roosevelt, Churchill and the Second Front, Moscow, 1965, pp. 92-105, 110-122; Trukhanovsky V. G. Winston Churchill. Politicheskaya biografiya [Political Biography], Moscow, 1968, pp. 366-367.

45 Cretzianu A. The Rumanian Armistice Negotiations: Cairo 1944. - Journal of Central European Affairs, 1951, N 2, p. 244.

46 Israelyan V. L., Kutakov L. N. Uk. soch., pp. 334-336.

47 Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voyny 1939-1945 [History of the Second World War 1939-1945], vol. 8, Moscow, 1977, p. 98.

48 Foreign policy of the Soviet Union during the Patriotic War. T. P. M. 1946, p. 105.

49 Izvestiya, 4, 5. IV. 1944.

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On April 2 and by the GKO Decree of April 10, 1944, which stated that the Military Council of the 2nd Ukrainian Front was obliged to preserve the existing Romanian authorities, the system of administrative and social structure, and guarantee freedom of religious rites in the country50 . The Soviet military administration immediately began to provide assistance to local authorities in overcoming economic difficulties and normalizing life, supplying the population, primarily the poor, with goods and medicines. Factories, factories and workshops began to work again in the cities, and shops opened. In the villages, the peasants sowed not only their plots, but also the land they rented from the local authorities, abandoned by the fleeing landlords. Romanian citizens spoke warmly of the Soviet military doctors who treated them for free .51
Friendly relations were established between Soviet soldiers and the local population. In the political reports of the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, it was reported: "The main part [of the population] treats the Red Army with sympathy and is quite friendly";" The population provides great assistance to the army in organizing ammunition wagons, building bridges, airfields, repairing roads", etc .52. The peasants who spoke at the meetings demanding the division of landlords ' lands did not hide their chagrin when it was explained to them that the Red Army "does not intend to introduce Soviet laws and regulations in Rumania"53 and that the solution of internal problems is the business of the Rumanian people themselves. The facts show that the Red Army was by no means engaged in "exporting the revolution", as the bourgeois falsifiers insist, but behaved as a liberator from fascism and a friend of the Romanian workers.

The success of the Red Army in the first months of 1944 made the Romanian oligarchy even more eager to seek support from the Western Powers. Without renouncing the alliance with the Nazis, it secretly sent its emissary Prince B. Stirbey to Turkey to conduct separate negotiations with Anglo-American diplomats. Officially, he represented the "opposition". But the instructions he received were coordinated with the Antonescu clique and the royal court. Stirbey, however, was asked in Istanbul by the British and American embassies to negotiate with representatives of all three great allied powers, because in London and Washington they understood that in that situation it was risky to conduct such negotiations without the participation of a Soviet representative. And the Romanian envoy in Ankara, A. Kretsyan, was given to understand earlier that there was still no hope of Anglo-American troops appearing near the Romanian borders, and therefore it would be more expedient for Bucharest to turn its weapons against Germany before the Soviet troops approached the borders of Romania .54 This would serve as a formal excuse to try to prevent the Red Army from entering the territory of Romania.

However, the Romanian oligarchy persisted, and during the negotiations that began on March 17, 1944 in Cairo between Stirbey and representatives of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain, the Romanian emissary tried to convince the allies to send Anglo-American troops to his country "to ensure" Romania's exit from the war. From what he said, it was clear that the Government of his country did not intend to fight against Germany and preferred to limit itself to offering German troops to leave Romania at a certain time. "It was not difficult to see," wrote N. V. Novikov, the Soviet representative at the negotiations and the USSR Ambassador to Egypt, "that such conditions in a veiled form were intended to complicate the military actions of the Red Army against the Wehrmacht." 55
In a note to the British government dated March 22, 1944, the USSR expressed doubts that negotiations with Stirbey "can lead to positive results",

50 Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voyny 1939-1945 [History of the Second World War 1939-1945]. Vol. 8, pp. 99-100.

51 TsAMO SSSR, f. 240, op. 2772, d. 124, l. 49; Graiul Liber, 27, 29. IV; 3, 5, 6, 9, 18, 21, 27, 29.VII. 1944.

52 TsAMO SSSR, f. 240, op. 2772, d. 130, l. 355; d. 124, l. 42 ob.

53 Ibid., 124, l. 45.

54 FRUS, 1944, vol. IV. Washington. 1966, p. 148.

55 Novikov N. V. Puti i pereputya diplomata (zapiski o 1943-1944 gg.) [Ways and crossroads of a diplomat (notes on 1943-1944)]. Moscow, 1976, p. 223.

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and on April 12, 1944, Romania was given 56 Soviet armistice terms agreed with the United States and Great Britain, which provided for: "break with the Germans and joint struggle of the Romanian and Allied forces, including the Red Army, against the Germans in order to restore the independence and sovereignty of Romania"; "restoration of the Soviet-Romanian border under the Treaty of 1940"; "compensation for losses caused to the Soviet Union by military actions and the occupation of Soviet territories by Romania"; consent of the USSR to cancel the Vienna Arbitration on Northern Transylvania 57 .

Romania's fascist rulers were slow to respond. Hoping for a major offensive promised by Berlin, they decided, as Antonescu admitted at the 1946 Bucharest trial ,that "we must wait." 58 It was only on May 29, 1944, that the Romanian government, through its envoy in Stockholm, Fr. Nanu relayed the answer. It showed that the position of the Romanian oligarchy had not changed. The memorandum even demanded that the issue of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina be postponed until after the peace conference .59 In this situation, on June 1, 1944, the Romanian delegates in Cairo were told on behalf of the three Allied Powers that further negotiations were useless. 60
Each successive day of the war in alliance with Germany turned into new hardships for Romania. The German troops that flooded the country, retreating under the blows of the Red Army, subjected the population to shameless plunder. Representatives of the Reich demanded that Bucharest take over the supply of the Wehrmacht and allocate an additional 55 billion lei for this purpose for May - September 1944 .61 Prices for basic necessities and taxes were rising uncontrollably in the country. The workers were starving. Constant requisitions of livestock and food ruined even well-to-do farms in the village. The dictator himself admitted at a government meeting on April 22, 1944, that the country was in chaos. In the frontline zone, most senior officials have fled, "leaving their posts" 62 . In June, after another trip around the country, Antonescu, telling members of the government about his impressions, concluded:: "I saw the country slipping out of my grasp and disaster brewing with every passing moment." 63
The victories of the Red Army provided a guarantee that the liberation struggle of the masses against the Antonescu dictatorship could be crowned with success. Having taken a course to prepare for an armed uprising, the Communist Party intensified its activities. Leaflets were distributed in which workers and peasants were called upon to "join the patriotic anti-Hitler front", strengthen the struggle against the German occupiers; sabotage government activities; evade conscription and desert with weapons in their hands in order to create partisan detachments in the forests and mountains; attack the garrisons and warehouses of the Nazis .64
The political organizations of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts continued to conduct extensive explanatory work among the Romanian troops on the front line. Thus, from April to June 1944, the Political directorate of the 3rd Ukrainian Front published 44 titles of leaflets in the Romanian language and distributed them to Romanian servicemen, soldiers and officers with a total circulation of 1.907 million copies. The secret services reported that "hatred of the regime and the war is growing every day"; workers "talk among themselves about the need to end the war and overthrow the government."-

56 Israelyan V. L., Kutakov L. N. Uk. soch., p. 331; FRUS, 1944, vol. IV. p. 169.

57 Foreign policy of the Soviet Union during the Patriotic War, vol. II, pp. 174-175.

58 Procesul marii tradari rationale. Bucuresti. 1946, pp. 80 - 81.

59 Hillgruber A. Op. cit., S. 198.

60 Yisraelyan V. L. Anti-Hitler Coalition. 1941-1945. Moscow, 1959, p. 374.

61 TsGA MSSR, f. 706, op. 1, d. 600, ll. 4-9, 13, 14; IDA, f. MRD. Convorbirea din 24 mai 1944 cud-1 ministru Killinger.

62 TsGA MSSR, f. 706, on. 1, d. 592, l. 263.

63 Livyanu V. et al. From the chronicle of historical days. May 1, 1944-March 6, 1945 Bucharest, 1974, pp. 29, 47.

64 TsGA MSSR, f. 1761, op. 3, d. 29, ll. 31, 38, 41-46; From the chronicle of historical days, p. 17, 18.

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In order to "hasten the fall of General Antonescu, many are also ready to commit acts of sabotage."65 On 14 July, these bodies reported from Brasov that local workers were arming themselves, gathering information about the size of Hitler's and gendarme units, creating teams to free deserters from prisons, and maintaining contact with Soviet officials. prisoners of war for their release at the right moment, conduct propaganda in the garrison troops and transit units.

Acts of sabotage have become more frequent. The atmosphere in the village was also heating up. Open anti-German demonstrations took place in the villages of Alexeni, Tsyganesti, and Fetesti. The gendarmerie of the Yalomitsky uyezd reported: "The situation in the villages is very restless, and the situation is unfavorable for the continuation of the war. This is also facilitated by soldiers retreating from the Crimea, who, having come into contact with the peasants, conduct propaganda for ending the war and expelling German troops from the country. Some bring with them Communist leaflets that were distributed at the front. " 66 It was in 1944, under the leadership of the Communist Party, that the partisan movement was born in the country. Detachments of patriots attacked the Nazis, committed sabotage on the railways.

At the request of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Romania, the USSR provided great assistance in organizing the partisan movement on the territory of Romania. In the training centers of the Ukrainian Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (USPD), Romanians sent there on the recommendation of the Communist Party were trained to train radio operators and bombers.The USPD provided the organizers of the partisan movement sent to the enemy's rear with weapons, uniforms and communications equipment. A total of 11 such groups were created and sent 67 . The CPR itself trained combat troops. E. Bodnerash was responsible from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation for their organization. From July 20 to August 23, 1944, the number of such groups in Bucharest alone increased from 6 to 50 .68 They were also created in other cities.

German troops in Romania numbered more than 600 thousand people. The Romanian people could not defeat them on their own. The Communist Party therefore attributed the beginning of the uprising to favorable external circumstances - a new offensive by the Red Army and the collapse of the Frisner Army Group. At the same time, the Communist Party continued to work to unite the country's anti-fascist forces on the basis of a united workers ' front.

The entry of the Red Army into the north-eastern regions of Romania forced the SDP leadership to change its position, take into account the mood of the workers and the pressure from the party's grassroots organizations, which demanded unity of the proletarian ranks. The SDP started negotiations with the Communist Party in April. They ended with an agreement on the creation of the United Workers ' Front (ERF). His platform, which reflected the position of the Communist Party, was set out in the leaflet " To the whole working class! To the Romanian people! " 69, published on May 1, 1944. In order to isolate the ruling fascist clique, as well as due to the fact that certain sections of the petty bourgeoisie, peasantry, employees and intellectuals who were interested in destroying the fascist regime and democratizing the social system were not free from illusions about the "historical" parties, especially the National Tsaranists, the Communist Party once again proposed on April 24 The management of the NCP should join the ERF. This time, the leaders of the NCP and the national liberals who collaborated with them did not dare to reject the proposal of the CPR, entered into negotiations with the CPR and the SDP, but they were in no hurry to sign the agreement.

65 Ibid.

66 From the chronicle of historical days, p. 19 - 20, 26, 53, 61, 62, 75.

67 Soviet Ukraine during the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. Doc. 3. Kiev, 1980, pp. 231-232; Asmolov A. N. Front in the rear of the Wehrmacht, Moscow, 1977, pp. 188-191; Party Archive of the Institute of Party History under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldova, f. 3280, op. 1, 39, ll. 10, 37, 44.

68 Kupsha I. et al. Romania's contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany (August 23, 1944-May 9, 1945). Moscow, 1959, p. 37; Studii si materiale de istorie contemporana. Vol. III. Bucureti. 1978, pp. 17 - 18.

69 DIPCR, 1953, p. 380.

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At the same time, the Communist Party continued to maintain contacts established in the autumn of 1943 with the palace circles. Concerned about the fate of the monarchy, the latter now tried to get rid of Antonescu. A document entitled "Crown Council", drawn up by Mihai's entourage at the beginning of May 1944, expressed the fear that if cooperation with Antonescu continued,"the Romanian people would naturally be inclined to turn their eyes to new forms of political and social organization." 70 The palace circles wanted to implement all the changes according to the scenario developed by the" historical " parties. However, when it became clear that Stirbey's mission had little chance of success, they strengthened contacts with the Communist Party in order to present themselves as enemies of fascism at the right moment. KIR, for her part, believed that the monarchy's interest in eliminating the fascist clique should be used to overthrow the Antonescu dictatorship and expel the German troops.

Palace circles suggested replacing Antonescu's men with the government of I. Cigurtu, known for his pro-Fascist sympathies and connections with Berlin, with Hitler's consent. Behind the screen of Dzhigurtu, the new government, in which key posts were supposed to be given to the king's entourage, was supposed to withdraw the country from the war and ensure its neutrality. The Communist Party opposed such a plan, pointing out that it would not lull Berlin's vigilance and disorient the masses. At the meeting of representatives of the Communist Party held on the night of June 13-14, 1944 (l. Patraskanu, E. Bodneras) and the royal court "option Dzhigurtu" was rejected by the Communists. They put forward their own plan, which provided for an armed uprising involving the masses of the people and the entry of Romania into the war against Germany. The palace circles were forced to accept this plan. A military committee was formed to prepare for the uprising, the start date of which was supposed to be set later, taking into account the degree of readiness for it and the situation on the Soviet-German front.

Fearing isolation altogether, the leaders of the NCP and the NLP signed an agreement on June 20 on a National Democratic Bloc (NDB) consisting of four parties: the Communist Party, the SDP, the NCP and the NLP. "1. Immediate conclusion of an armistice with the United Nations (the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States of America) on the basis of a proposal made by the Allies. 2. Withdrawal of Romania from the Axis, liberation of the country from German occupation, accession to the United Nations, restoration of national independence and sovereignty. 3. Elimination of the current dictatorial regime for this purpose, replacing it with a constitutional, democratic regime based on granting rights and civil liberties to all citizens of the country. 4. Support for a democratic order and ensure peace in accordance with the interests of the State and the Romanian people"71 . It was stipulated that each party included in the NDB retains its ideological and political independence.

But after joining the PDB, the leaders of the" historical " parties did not even think of fulfilling their obligations or simply contributing to the implementation of the planned program, and continued to maintain contact with the Antonescu clique. Maniu imposed fruitless discussions on the NDB in anticipation of, as one Siguranza document puts it, "a new conjuncture."72 This line of sabotage was also carried out by him in foreign policy: "In mid-June, Maniu, with the consent of King Mihai, announced that he was accepting the Soviet terms. But this time he also put forward as his indispensable condition the demand for an air landing (of Anglo-American troops - I. L.). Naturally, the representatives of the three powers did not find grounds for reconsidering their decision, " and in July, the adviser to the Soviet embassy in Cairo, D. S. Solod, "still continued to maintain contact in rare meetings with the Romanian emissary, but it did not give any result. " 73
The Communist Party developed a detailed plan for the uprising. On July 7, at the meeting, representatives of-

70 Anale, 1978, pp. 126-127; for a detailed analysis of this document, see: Lebedev N. I. The Collapse of fascism in Romania. 1976, pp. 478-479.

71 Cit. by: Lebedev N. I. The collapse of fascism in Romania. 1976, p. 472.

72 From the chronicle of historical days, p. 52.

73 Novikov I. V. Uk. soch., p. 228.

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Representatives of the Communist Party of Moldova, the NCP, the NLP, and palace circles, Patrascanu and Bodneras, handed Colonel D. Damachan, a member of the Military Committee and Chief of Staff of the Bucharest Garrison, a list of 100 military and civilian objects, including 33 of particular importance, that should have been captured first on the day of the uprising. Representatives of the EPR proposed to send representatives from the NDB to Moscow before August 1 for direct negotiations with the Soviet government, 74 and on July 24, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union submitted to the military committee a list of the main problems to be solved in preparing the uprising, including the timely formation of a government based on the four NDB parties, the preparation of the texts of the appeal to the people and the statement of the new government. governments to broadcast them on the day of the uprising, as well as a number of military issues.

The leaders of the NCP and NLP have not yet given up the idea of persuading Antonescu to conclude a truce with the USSR. But the dictator visited Germany on August 5, where he met with Hitler. The latter promised to" protect " Romania, and Antonescu assured the Fuhrer of loyalty. At the same time, Romania's fascist rulers made another attempt to win immediate Anglo-American military support. In the first decade of August, they sent new emissaries to Istanbul - Prof. Giurescu and Colonel Teodorescu. They, on behalf of Antonescu, declared that the government was ready to grant England and the United States any concessions in the oil, coal, timber and other industries, if London and Washington would accept the payment of war reparations that the USSR might demand from Romania, and send airborne units and naval forces to Romania via the Black Sea .75 Otherwise, Antonescu was determined to continue the war.

As you know, in August 1944, the Soviet Army brilliantly conducted the Iasi-Kishinev operation. Its political goal was to complete the liberation of Soviet Moldavia and Soviet Ukraine, to bring Romania out of the war on the side of Hitler's Germany, and to lead to a sharp change in the military-political situation not only in Romania itself, but throughout South-Eastern Europe. Through the territory of Romania, Soviet troops opened the way to the borders of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and the Hungarian plain.

On August 20, 1944, the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front under the command of General of the Army R. Y. Malinovsky from the area northwest of Iasi and the 3rd Ukrainian Front under the command of General of the Army F. I. Tolbukhin from the Kitsk bridgehead on the right bank of the Dniester launched a decisive offensive against German and Romanian troops in the southern sector of the front. The Danube military flotilla under the command of Rear Admiral S. G. Gorshkov landed troops at Ackerman. During the two days of the offensive, the troops of the two fronts crushed the defenses of the German and Romanian troops and reached operational space 76 . By the end of August 21, the enemy had exhausted its operational reserves and could no longer significantly influence the further course of Operation 77 . In the evening of the same day, the command of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts received an order from the Stavka to send part of their forces to the area of Khushi to complete the encirclement of the enemy group in the Chisinau salient and open the road to the economic and political centers of Romania .78
In an effort to avoid encirclement, on August 22, the German command tried to withdraw its troops beyond the Prut River. "But," Frisner wrote, "it was already too late, and the situation on the Army Group front had become disastrous"; by the end of August 23, "the encirclement of the German 6th Army could be considered an accomplished fact." 79 In the" cauldron "were the main forces of army Group "Southern Ukraine": 18 of the 25 German divisions. By that time, all the Romanian divisions at the front had also been routed or surrounded, and some of them had been destroyed.

74 From the chronicle of historical days, p. 57.

75 FRUS, 1944, vol. IV, p. 187.

76 Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voyny 1939-1945 [History of the Second World War 1939-1945]. Vol. 9, pp. 104-105.

77 History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. Vol. 4, p. 259.

78 Iasi-Kishinev Cannes, p. 134.

79 Frisner G. Uk. soch., pp. 86, 88.

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Romanian units then began to go over to the side of the Red Army and even turned their weapons against the Nazis .80
The southern section of the German front collapsed. The command of the 6th German Army fled to the Carpathians and could no longer practically control the troops. By the end of the day on August 23, Soviet troops had reached the towns of Bakau and Tekuch. It was the defeat of the Hitlerite and Romanian troops that caused the subsequent events. By the end of August 27, the group of fascist troops, which was in the "cauldron" east of the Prut river, was eliminated. Two days later, the same fate befell the units that crossed to the other side of the river in order to break through to the Carpathian passes. During the Iasi-Kishinev operation of the Red Army, about 209 thousand German and Romanian soldiers and officers were captured, including 25 generals, and a huge amount of enemy military equipment was destroyed and captured .81
The defeat of the German-Romanian troops during this operation led to the collapse of the German defense on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, changed the military-political situation in the Balkans and thereby created the decisive conditions for the victory of the armed uprising of August 23, 1944 in Romania. The news of the collapse near Iasi and Chisinau caused consternation in the Romanian oligarchy. Antonescu went to the front, still hoping to save the situation. On August 21 and 22, he met with Frisner, and they decided to create a new line of defense. On August 23, Antonescu called a meeting of the government in a narrow format. The issue of organizing defense and evacuating the main government institutions from Bucharest was discussed. After that, Antonescu asked for an audience with the king.

The royal palace was particularly lively all those days. Meetings of representatives of the Crown and NDB parties were held. The Communist Party demanded the immediate overthrow of the Antonescu clique, a truce and the formation of a new government consisting of representatives of the PDB. The Military Committee for the Preparation of the uprising decided to start it on August 26, 82 . But the leaders of the" historical " parties did not think of an uprising.

On August 22 and 23, the vice-chairmen of the NCP I. Michalake and the NLP G. Bratianu were still trying to persuade the conductor to sign a truce. They tried to impose their position on the NDB at a meeting held on the morning of August 23. Representatives of the Communist Party of Moldova rejected this harassment and demanded compliance with the previously reached agreement on the overthrow of Antonescu and the creation of the PDB government.

In the royal palace, the options for the outcome of the meeting with Antonescu were discussed. One thing was clear: the situation at the front was disastrous, the German and Rumanian troops were defeated, and it was impossible to delay the Red Army's advance: therefore, if the conductor refused to conclude an armistice, it was necessary, in order to save the monarchy, not to miss the last chance to dissociate himself from the Antonescu clique. Representatives of the court established contact with the leadership of the Communist Party. The Communists have put combat detachments on alert. The success of the Soviet troops in the Iasi-Kishinev operation made it possible to postpone decisive actions against the military fascist dictatorship from August 26 to 23.

The conditions of the arrest of the Antonescu clique, which initiated the national armed uprising, and the course of the uprising itself are described in special literature. Frisner, reporting at 23 o'clock. On August 23, Hitler reported the events in Romania and received his order to eliminate the " putsch "and create a" new government "in Bucharest, hinted at"the impossibility of fulfilling this order." The same opinion was expressed by the head of the German military mission in Romania, General E. Hansen. In a telephone conversation with Frisner, he confirmed that German forces "are not enough to occupy Bucharest and eliminate the new government" and that "the action will definitely not succeed" 83 . Indeed, in the rear areas of Romania there were only about 60 thousand German soldiers and officers from the rear units and detachments of 84 . It is no longer necessary to count on the transfer of German formations from the front to Bucharest-

80 Antosyak A.V. Uk. soch., pp. 127-129.

81 History of the Second World War, 1939-1945, vol. 9, pp. 104-109.

82 Insurecfia din august 1944 si semnificafia ei istorica. Bucuresti. 1974, p. 158.

83 Frisner G. Uk. soch., pp. 91-94.

84 Antosyak A, V. Uk. soch., p. 113.

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it went. At that time, some troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts were eliminating the encircled enemy group, while others-more than 50 divisions-were rapidly advancing into the depths of Romania. "The powerful offensive launched by the Soviet Army on the Iasi-Kishinev front on August 20, which led to the defeat of the main group of Hitlerite forces on the territory of the country and to the liberation offensive, put the Hitlerite command in such a position that it could not draw forces from the front to turn them against the insurgents."85
Until August 28, the Romanian troops of the Bucharest garrison, combat patriotic groups (about 2 thousand people) and detachments from other parts of the country that came to their aid repelled the attacks of the Nazis, which lasted until the latter were dealt a new blow by the Red Army formations. Romanian troops were also engaged in armed clashes with German units in other parts of the country. The popular anti-fascist uprising was the logical conclusion of the struggle of the Romanian workers under the leadership of the Communist Party against the dictatorship of Antonescu and Hitler's allies"; the uprising began under favorable conditions of the defeat of the fascist troops in the Iasi - Kishinev operation, which was crucial for the success of the entire movement.

On August 30, Soviet troops entered Bucharest, consolidating the success of the uprising. N. Ceausescu, General Secretary of the RCP and President of the SRR, noted that "the broad masses of the population of Bucharest welcomed with enthusiasm and special sympathy the entry of Soviet troops into the liberated capital."86
In September-October 1944, the Red Army continued fighting for the liberation of Romania from Nazi troops. In these battles, in accordance with the terms of the armistice, Romanian soldiers fought together with Soviet soldiers. By October 25, the territory of Romania was completely cleared.

The liberation of Romania was achieved at the cost of great sacrifices on the Soviet side. From March to October 1944, the total losses of the Red Army only on Romanian soil exceeded 286,000 people, including 69,000 killed. The losses of the Romanian troops in the fight against the Nazis from August 23 to October 30 amounted to 58 thousand people killed, wounded and missing, and until the end of the war - 168 thousand people .87 Later, on behalf of the Romanian people, N. Ceausescu expressed gratitude to "the glorious army of the Soviet Union, which at the cost of huge sacrifices crushed the Hitlerite military machine, made a decisive contribution to the liberation of Romania and other countries from the fascist yoke, in the defeat of Hitlerite Germany."88
The liberation of Romania by the Red Army, the uprising of August 23, 1944, and the further participation of the Romanian people in the war against nazi Germany marked the beginning of new relations between the USSR and Romania. Their solid legal basis is the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the SRR, the joint Soviet-Romanian declaration of 1976, and the agreements reached as a result of subsequent meetings of leading party and state figures of the two countries.

85 Popescu-Putsuri I. et al. Uk. soch., p. 88.

86 Ceausescu N. Romania on the way to building a fully developed socialist society. Reports, speeches, articles, vol. IV. Bucharest, 1970, p. 40.

87 Antosyak A.V. Uk. soch., pp. 176-177; Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voyny 1939-1945. Vol. 9, p. 118; Vtoroi mirovoi voyny, p. 388; Contributia Romaniei la victoria asupra fascismului. Bucuresti. 1965, p. 143; Romania in razboiul antihitlerist, p. 583.

88 Ceausescu N. Uk. soch. T. V. Bucharest, 1971, p. 866.

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