Richters, K. (2013) The Post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church: Politics, Culture and Greater Russia. London: Routiedge. - 212 p.

The main topic of Katya Richters ' new book - the published version of her doctoral dissertation defended at the University of London-is the question of the degree of independence of the modern Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (ROC) from the Russian state. To answer this question, the author analyzes the political preferences and strategies of the Moscow Patriarchate as they are reflected in central documents, on websites, and in the author's conversations with representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church. Richters focuses on the positions of the ROC elite, but also includes the opinions of some middle-level clergy in his analysis. She also spoke with scientists, journalists, and government officials.

The purpose of Richter's work is to understand to what extent the Russian Orthodox Church has its own position and to what extent it is able to formulate it independently of the secular authorities, without repeating or imitating (mimic) the secular political elite. Among the areas where the position of the Russian Orthodox Church is considered, special attention is paid to the issue of national identity in Richter's book.

Many researchers believe that the post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church did not succeed-if at all-in becoming an independent element of the new civil society, which it was given the opportunity to do after the collapse of the USSR. In presenting this opinion, Richter refers to the book by Zoey Knox1, but she believes that the Russian Orthodox Church still has its own "own agenda". This agenda consists primarily in the desire to become "first among equals" in the Orthodox world. To achieve this goal, the Church had to turn to the Russian state for support (p. 8), which gradually led to a lack of independence.

1. Knox, Z. (2004) Russian Society and the Orthodox Church: Religion in Russia after Communism. London: Routiedge.

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Richters goes on to argue that during the presidency of Vladimir Putin, the Russian Orthodox Church's own goals very often coincided in practice with the Kremlin's political strategy, which complicates the task of assessing the presence and measure of church independence.

Nevertheless, the author is of the opinion that seeking help from a secular state did not lead the Russian Orthodox Church to a complete loss of independence. Richters also believes that state support is primarily pragmatic, since the state and the church share the same goal - to restore "Greater Russia". This concept is borrowed by the author from the political scientist Bertil Nygreri (it is not used, as far as I know, by the Russian Orthodox Church itself). "Great Russia" is bigger than the country of Russia. It is practically synonymous with the so-called post-Soviet space. It is interesting that Richter does not discuss the concept that the Russian Orthodox Church itself often uses in its "geopolitical" reflections, namely, the concept of "Orthodox civilization", which even includes the Orthodox "brothers" of Serbia. 2
Richter's book begins with a review of the "Foundations of the Social Concept" (2000), which sets out the ROC's vision of its place in society. In the Fundamentals, the Russian Orthodox Church first formulated a social concept and expressed its desire to play a new role in society (p.18). Despite the progressive nature of the initiative itself, the conservative political component of the "Fundamentals" is obvious. While not accepting the secularization of society, the Church still wants to be part of civil society; by opposing its religious vision to secular society, the Russian Orthodox Church simultaneously distances itself from "Orthodox fundamentalism."

The author considers remarkable (p.21) the program statement of the Russian Orthodox Church about its role as a potential critic of the state. This is the part of the document that says that if State policies violate Christian norms, the church can recognize the legitimacy of" peaceful civil disobedience " (p.26). This means that church support for state power has limits. The reaction of the authorities, including the newly elected President Vladimir Putin, to this statement of the church was, of course, negative. Nor did the document approve of the church's stated preference for monarchy over democracy. Kremlin criticism has not changed the position of the Russian Orthodox Church, but, according to the author,

2. Ср. Laruelle, M. (2009) In the Name of the Nation: Nationalism and Politics in Contemporary Russia. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. C. 165.

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The Kremlin has no reason to fear church disobedience - the declared possibility of disobedience is not taken seriously by the Church itself, which in practice seeks to support all state initiatives. For example, the Russian Orthodox Church deplores the collapse of the USSR with its "friendship of peoples", pointing out the severe consequences of the late-and post-Soviet conflicts. The Church supports President Putin's initiative to reintegrate the " Eurasian space "and his desire to return Russia to the status of an independent"great power".

According to Richters, Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church "see the world in the same way" (p. 32). But does this not mean that the independence of the Russian Orthodox Church from the Russian state, discussed in the book, is reduced to rare exceptions (for example, an abstract justification of the monarchy) and is only theoretical independence?

If the "Fundamentals" express the theoretical desire of the church to be an active and independent social actor from the state, then the political practice of the Russian Orthodox Church focuses more on state power than on civil society. "Support for the idea of a powerful Russia has nothing to do with theology, "Richters goes on to write," but rather with "the identification of the Russian Orthodox Church with the Fatherland, its past and expected great future, the return of national pride" (p.35). It should be noted here that Richter's research work was probably completed before the beginning of Vladimir Putin's third presidency. So the author gives several examples of the disagreement between the Russian Orthodox Church and (former) President Medvedev. First of all, the Church did not share his "technological optimism." According to Richter, the position of the Russian Orthodox Church is closer to Putin's policy than to Medvedev's program, and from the point of view of the possibility of testing this hypothesis, it is a pity that the author did not continue her research for another year or two. The part of the analysis that discusses the differences between the Russian Orthodox Church and the president is now outdated. After Patriarch Kirill called Putin's period a "miracle of God," we are dealing with a completely different situation.

As mentioned above, the author is more interested in the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in the formation of a new Russian identity than in the "social theme" itself. In the chapter devoted to the relations of the Russian Orthodox Church with other religious groups and confessions, the author shows how widely the idea of the connection of Orthodoxy (and other religions and faiths) with space, territory and geography is widespread among the most prominent representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church. According to Richter,

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This explains why the Russian Orthodox Church is so radically opposed to the missionary activity of "non-traditional" religious movements in " Greater Russia "(cf.the wording of the 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations). According to Richters, " the tendencies of the Moscow Patriarchate to link religion with nationality and citizenship "(p.55) are also found in the content of the school course "Fundamentals of Orthodox Culture", especially in the first and rather controversial textbook of the course written by Alla Borodina.

The chapter of Richters ' book devoted to the Russian army examines in detail the initiatives and strategies of the Russian Orthodox Church aimed at spreading Orthodoxy and strengthening patriotism among military personnel. The Synodal Department for Interaction with the Armed Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies is called upon to lead this work (a similar department was created in Ukraine). From 2001 to 2013, the department was headed by Fr. Dimitri Smirnov, who became famous for his so-called "moderate fundamentalism". It is the army that has become the unique arena in which the Russian Orthodox Church allows itself to carry out "Orthodox fundamentalism", which is not officially approved for other areas that are more transparent to society.

Richter believes that the Russian Orthodox Church understands (Russian) Orthodoxy as the "ethnic religion" of the Russian people and as a means of expressing belonging to the Russian nation (p. 63). The author demonstrates this by analyzing the "patriotic", but rather selective, description of the history of the Russian army on the website of the Department for Interaction with the Armed Forces. On it (Russian) Orthodoxy, for example, is sharply contrasted with Chechen - or even "Caucasian" - Islam. Ethnic nationalism is thus openly encouraged by the Russian Orthodox Church (p. 71).

The last three chapters of Richter's book (5_7) are devoted to analyzing the activity of the Russian Orthodox Church outside the Russian Federation: in Estonia, Ukraine, and Belarus. At the same time, the discussion continues on the topic of "Great Russia" and the spatial imagination of the Russian Orthodox Church. What is very significant here is the fact that the Moscow Patriarchate considers "canonical territory" to be its exclusive prerogative, which means that only one hierarch can preside over such territory (p.85). According to this logic, the Russian Orthodox Church, without recognizing the rights of the Patriarchate of Constantinople to jurisdiction on its canonical territory, practically includes Estonia, as well as the rest of the "post-Soviet"world

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space, in the "Great Russia". The history of the Great Patriotic War is also important in this context. Here, the Russian Orthodox Church usually ignores Soviet atrocities, for example, in the Baltic States.

The practice of the Russian Orthodox Church in relation to the near abroad largely coincides with the state, but Richters notes that the Russian Orthodox Church can afford to interfere in religious life, politics, and thus in the sovereignty of countries such as Estonia, which the Russian president cannot afford. As for Ukraine, the main issue here is the relationship between the Moscow and Kiev Patriarchates. The latter declared itself autocephalous in 1992, but, as is known, was not recognized in this capacity by Moscow.

Richters analyzes the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) as a sphere of influence of the Russian Orthodox Church. The latter often emphasizes the importance of Kiev for Russian Orthodoxy and its status as the cradle of "Holy Russia" (cf. Patriarch Kirill's new concept 3) and does not want to recognize Ukraine as an independent nation. However, it is difficult for the UOC-MP itself to question Ukrainian sovereignty, which naturally leads to new dilemmas.

Such problems do not exist in Belarus - the Belarusian Orthodox Church is completely subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate, thus considering itself part of the "Great Russia". On the other hand, its attitude to the Vatican is not as negative as in Moscow, since Catholicism in Belarus is not understood as an alien (non-traditional) religion. Richter further notes that Patriarch Kirill recently expressed concern about the close relationship between church and state under the Lukashenko regime. It also reviews "underground" Orthodox churches in Belarus. In general, it should be noted that the historical references about church life and politics in Estonia, Ukraine and Belarus in Richter's book are rich in interesting details and will be useful for many researchers.

Throughout the analysis, Richter, on the one hand, wants to show that the Russian Orthodox Church has its own agenda, and on the other hand, emphasizes the proximity of this agenda to the state strategy. Richter's main methodological tool is the concept of "political culture".-

3. Wed. Suslov M. "Holy Russia": Geopolitical imagination in the modern Russian Orthodox Church / / Forum of the newest Eastern European History and Culture. 2013. N 2. pp. 311-327 (an analysis that complements Richter's research on this topic).

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tours", which she borrowed from such theorists as Archie Brown, Stephen White, and Mary McAuley. The concept implies ideas, orientations, assumptions, knowledge, loyalties, behavioral patterns, etc.that are common to a certain group of people, formed by history and traditions, as well as - to an even greater extent - the existing political system, which, in turn, significantly affects the actions of the group - in this case, the Russian Orthodox Church. Political culture is a habit. Although I do not find a clear definition of the concept of "political culture" in Richters ' book, her analysis of the ROC's attitude to the state in the post-Soviet context is based on the thesis of the actual dependence of the Church on the political culture of the Soviet experience with its "ubiquitous" statehood.

Political culture is stable, it changes rather slowly, and Richters argues that the socialization of today's church leaders back in the USSR determines their political culture to a greater extent than the "ancient Christian tradition". At the same time, Richter does not exclude the presence of traditional elements in the political culture of the Church and recognizes the historical experience of the Church in the Russian Empire as an important part of its modern political culture (pp. 7-8).

The problem with this book is that the term "political culture" is used rather casually in the text of the study. "Political culture" usually means simply "opinions", "views", "interpretations", which makes it difficult to understand the analysis and, unfortunately, makes it too confusing from time to time. Here are some examples from the book where the term is used without the necessary scientific rigor: "the political cultures in the light of which the Moscow Patriarchate and the Kremlin conduct their foreign policy towards Estonia coincide [in the sense that] they are united by a very similar vision of the country's Soviet past [and] agreement on how the Baltic state should be used in the the state should be linked to Russia" (p. 93); "this political culture is linked to the concept of 'Great Russia' "(p. 94);" [The Chernobyl disaster] is another issue on which the political cultures of the Moscow Patriarchate in Russia and Belarus differ" (p. 134); " spheres of influence of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Belarusian Orthodox Church. where Orthodox and secular authorities share a similar political culture can be grouped into three groups: how Russia is governed; how it interacts with other states; and how history is interpreted." 150).

But despite its methodological and conceptual limitations-

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Richters ' book is interesting for its up-to-date analysis of a number of aspects of the contemporary practice of the Russian Orthodox Church. Of course, the author's thesis about the independence of the Russian Orthodox Church from the state is only a hypothesis, and it can be argued that the church and the state share both common views on society and political goals. The main advantage of Richters ' book is the analysis of the central position that the idea of a "Great Russia" occupies in the social activities of the Russian Orthodox Church. Richter describes and discusses the most interesting paradox: the self-identification of the Russian Orthodox Church with the Soviet era, in practice the former time of repression and religious persecution, as with the time of "Great Russia".

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